Since January 8, 2026, Internet traffic from Iran has effectively dropped to zero, marking a complete shutdown of the country's connection to the global Internet. Cloudflare Radar data provides clear evidence of this dramatic digital blackout coinciding with widespread protests across the nation.

Background: A Pattern of Shutdowns

The Iranian government has a documented history of severing Internet connectivity during civil unrest. In November 2019, protests over fuel price increases led to a five-day Internet shutdown. In September 2022, following the death of Mahsa Amini in police custody, Internet services were disrupted across multiple network providers.

The current protests, which erupted in late December 2025, initially focused on economic concerns—inflation, food prices, and currency depreciation—but have evolved into broader demands for regime change.

The Shutdown Unfolds

Early warning signs appeared in the first days of 2026, with traffic anomalies indicating potential connectivity issues. However, traffic levels recovered by January 5 and even exceeded expected peaks in the following days.

On January 8, the situation changed dramatically:

11:50 UTC (15:20 local time): IPv6 address space announced by Iranian networks dropped 98.5%, falling from over 48 million /48 blocks to just 737,000. This reduced IPv6's share of human-generated traffic from 12% to 2%.

13:30 UTC (17:00 local time): A second drop eliminated virtually all IPv6 traffic from Iran.

16:30-17:00 UTC (20:00-20:30 local time): Overall traffic volumes plummeted nearly 90%, with major providers including MCCI, IranCell, and TCI losing connectivity.

18:45 UTC: Internet traffic from Iran dropped to effectively zero, signaling complete disconnection from the global Internet.

Brief Windows of Connectivity

On January 9, extremely low traffic volumes (less than 0.01% of pre-shutdown peaks) became visible starting around 10:00 UTC. Access to Cloudflare's 1.1.1.1 DNS resolver briefly spiked, and several Iranian universities—including University of Tehran, Sharif University of Technology, and Tehran University of Medical Science—saw connectivity temporarily restored around 11:30 UTC. However, all traffic from these networks disappeared again after 15:00 UTC.

Technical Indicators of Filtering

Prior to the complete shutdown, clear shifts in HTTP traffic patterns suggested sophisticated filtering was being implemented. On major networks like IranCell, HTTP/3 usage fell from 40% to just 5% between December 31 and early January. Similar patterns emerged on TCI, where HTTP/3 traffic declined below 5% by January 3. These changes indicate layered, upgraded whitelisting and filtering systems being deployed.

Ongoing Monitoring

As of the latest Cloudflare data, Iran remains almost entirely cut off from the global Internet, with traffic volumes at a fraction of a percent of previous levels. The shutdown continues to impact millions of Iranians' ability to communicate with the outside world.

Cloudflare Radar continues to provide near-real-time insights into Iran's Internet connectivity status through its Traffic and Routing pages.

Source: Cloudflare Blog